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INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the EUMember States in December 2007, which bycommon accord agreed to amend the Treaty on
European Union, the Treaties establishing the European
Communities, and certain related Acts.
The Treaty of Lisbon concludes a long process which
started after the process of EU enlargement with 10 new
Member States. In fact the Lisbon Treaty is a follow-up to
the Laeken Declaration of the European Council of
December 2001, the text of the Constitutional Treaty and
the process of Treaty revision that had been re-started,
after a period of reflection in June 2007, after the negative
referenda in France and the Netherlands. The Laeken
Declaration proclaimed that there is a need for
improvements in the areas of democratic legitimacy and
transparency of the EU institutions, the role of the national
Parliaments, the efficiency of decision-making and the
coherence in European foreign policy.
According to Article 48 of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU), the amendments of the EU and EC Treaties
will enter into force after being ratified by all the Member
States in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements. If the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified in
accordance with the constitutional requirements of each
Member State, it will enter into force according to the
original timeframe on January 1, 2009.
Only one EU country, Ireland, out of 27 Member States,
has, according to its Constitution, to approve the Lisbon
Treaty by referendum. Ireland accounts for less than 1 per
cent of the bloc’s population of almost 500 million
citizens. The “no” vote of June 13 has blocked the
improvement for the Treaty and might detonate a political
crisis.
The result of the referendum not to ratify the Lisbon
Treaty – “yes” 46.5 per cent, “no” 53.5 per cent – does
raise several political and constitutional questions for legal
solutions that would finally allow for the ratification of the
treaty (The actual percentages of rejection were more or
less identical with those of the rejection of the Nice Treaty
– see hereafter). The Irish referendum on the Lisbon
Treaty is a recent example of the importance of national
constitutions and its impact on European integration. In
my opinion, for the further development of European
integration it is neither acceptable nor democratic that less
than approximately 1 million Irish voters can prevent
progress for approximately 500 million European citizens
by blocking further European integration, which was the
objective of the Lisbon Treaty.
REFERENDA IN OTHER STATES
It is however not the first time that a referendum has
formed an obstacle for the ratification of an European
Treaty. There was a near failure to have the Maastricht
Treaty ratified in Denmark and in France. In Norway the
Accession Treaty was rejected by a referendum, the first
time in 1973 and the second time in 1994. The Agreement
on the European Economic Area was rejected in a
subsequent national referendum in Switzerland in 1992.
On June 7, 2001 a referendum also held in Ireland on
the Nice Treaty was negative: “no” 53.87 per cent and
“yes” 46.13 per cent. This was more or less identical to the
outcome of the Lisbon referendum. The Constitutional
Treaty was rejected in 2005 by France and the Netherlands.
In the following text some suggestions are given as a
contribution to an exchange of ideas on the finding of legal
and political solutions for these constitutional problems,
focusing on the recent Irish referendum.
The Irish complaints against the Lisbon Treaty were
quite varied, reflecting everything from fears over loss of
influence in an enlarged EU to concerns that the EU’s
military plans might threaten Ireland’s traditional
neutrality and loss of VAT taxation benefits. In fact they are
not directly related to the text of the Treaty, but to a large
extent reflected disenchantment with further integration,
which has been foisted on an unwilling electorate by
political elites. The referendum culture in Ireland is very
strong and, due to a series of political funding scandals,
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Do governments of EU Member States have to comply with loyalty and solidarity
obligations deriving from Article 10 EC and Article 11(2) of the EU Treaty?
there is a deep cynicism towards politicians. Moreover, the
electorate was assured in 1972 that with each significant
step towards integration there would be a referendum (see
A E Kellermann, “The Irish referendum on the Treaty of
Nice and Article 10 EC – A recent example of
constitutional problems of enlargement”, in EU
Enlargement, the Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level,
pp 499 – 502, Edited by Alfred E Kellermann, Jaap W de
Zwaan and Jeno Czuczai, TMC Asser Press, 2001).
The next move for Ireland is unclear. Its EU partners
have already ruled out a complete renegotiation of the
complex treaty. The alternative is a political declaration
attached to the treaty which seeks to meet Irish concerns.
The central question is:
Do governments of EU Member States have to comply with
the loyalty and solidarity obligations from Article 10 EC and
Article 11(2) EU with reference to the ratification of reform
treaties which have been agreed by common accord within the
European Council?
One of the main questions to be answered from a
European law perspective is whether national governments
–like for example the Irish Government – complied with
the duty of loyalty to the EU as mentioned in Article 10 EC
Treaty and in Article 11(2) EU Treaty.
Article 10 EC reads as follows:
“Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community’s tasks. They shall abstain
from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of
the objectives of this Treaty.”
Article 11(2) EU Treaty reads as follows:
“The Member States shall support the Union’s external and
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty
and mutual solidarity.
The Member States shall work together to enhance and
develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain
from any action which is contrary to the interests of the
Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in
international relations.
The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied
with.”
The principal and essentially legal question which arises
is whether Article 10 EC and Article 11(2) EU apply in this
context at all for national constitutional ratification
provisions. The first point concerns the implementation
of the procedure and Article 10 EC cq Article 11(2) EU.
The second point concerns the adaptation of the
national constitutional provisions.
(1) Ratification according to article 10 EC cq Article
11(2) EU obligation. Can the ratification provisions of
Article 48 TEU jo Article 313 (EC Treaty) be considered as
obligations arising out of the EU and EC Treaty as required
in the wording of Article 10 EC Treaty, or can these
obligations only be considered as obligations arising out of
international law after signing a treaty according to the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties?
(2) Adaptation of national constitution according to
Article 10 EC cq Article 11(2) EU obligation.
Do the implementation of the national constitutional
ratification provisions of Article 48 TEU jo Article 313 (EC
Treaty) also have to comply with the criteria of Article 10
EC cq Article 11(2) EU?
In other words: if the national constitutional provisions
would be a serious obstacle for the ratification of an EU
Treaty amendment, which had been agreed by common
accord within the European Council between all the
Member States, would the Member States in such a case be
obliged to replace the respective national constitutional
provisions, which require a referendum by another
procedure? National constitutional lawyers argue that
Article 10 EC will only apply to existing Treaty obligations
which will enter into force only after ratification.
Would it not be possible, as the European Court of
Justice has done in some earlier cases, to give a teleological
interpretation also to the provisions of Article 313 EC
Treaty (“This Treaty shall be ratified by the High
Contracting Parties......”) so that these provisions can be
considered as a community obligation of loyalty or
solidarity in the meaning of Article 10 EC and 11(2) EU?
Perhaps a teleological interpretation of these articles may
enlarge the applicability of Article 10 EC to agreements
concluded in unanimity by all the governments meeting
within the European Council. Would it not be possible to
interpret these agreements as decisions of the
representatives of the governments of the Member States
meeting within the Council? These acts or decisions have
generally a character of international law, but may in
certain cases form part of Community law and as such they
are not subject to any rules of national constitutional law
on the conclusion of international agreements.
If the answer is in the affirmative, and if therefore Article
10 EC and 11(2) EU and its principles of loyalty and
solidarity do apply, the question may arise whether it would
have been possible for the Irish Government to avoid all
the problems of the “no” vote. Was it wise to hold a
referendum for treaty approval, when the outcome was so
risky? Was the Irish Government guilty of not informing
the Irish people satisfactorily about the objectives of the
Treaty of Lisbon and of not stimulating enough “yes”
votes? If that were the case, then the Irish Government is
responsible for the delay in ratification (see P J G Kapteyn
and Verloren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the
European Communities, p 341, Edited by Laurence W
Gormley, Third Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1998).34
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As mentioned in the Financial Times of June 14, 2001,
Brian Cowen, the Irish foreign minister, indicated with
regard to the rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001 that
there would be no early move to put a new referendum to
the people to reverse the decision on enlargement of the
European Union. An identical opinion can now be put
forward as regards the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty. This
time Brian Cowen was Prime Minister!
The opinion expressed here to approximate
constitutional provisions is also in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, as the differences in the
constitutional requirements between the Member States
for the ratification of treaties may lead to bad results for
European integration if the objectives of the proposed
referenda are not sufficiently achieved by some
governments of the Member States. Given the importance
of the outcome of the referendum, should the Irish
Government, which after all signed the Treaty of Lisbon,
not have indicated that it would resign in the case of a NO
vote?
On the one hand, it is constitutionally advisable to hold
a referendum in order to comply with the requirement of
Article 6 TEU which refers to the principles of democracy
on which the Union is based; on the other hand, this case
shows that using referenda for amendment procedures of
rather complicated treaties is not always an efficient
procedure and may result in unexpected and unpleasant
outcomes for further European integration.
Assuming that Article 10 EC or its principles will more
or less apply in this Irish case, a short comment on the
interpretation of its provisions and reference to some ECJ
Decisions may be useful.
In its present wording Article 10 EC refers only to the
relationship between the Community and its Member
States and is formulated, moreover, as if it were a one-way-
street, that is as a duty imposed on the Member States to
take all measures to promote the Community interests (see
Report of the XIX FIDE Congress, Helsinki, June 1-3,
2000, p 9, W van Gerven).
The Community interests are in this case the speedy
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by all the Member States.
The notion of “Member State” is a global and wide one. It
covers not only the central authorities, the “executive” (the
central Government), but also the local and/or regional
authorities of a Member State (see Report of the XIX FIDE
Congress, Helsinki, June 1-3, 2000, p 229, Jaap W de
Zwaan, Idem Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch
recht (SEW), 48e jaargang no 4, April 2000, pp 132-54).
Where clear breaches of Community law are at hand, as
in violating the prohibition against discrimination, the
court is not impressed, generally speaking, by a Member
State invoking constitutional provisions to justify such a
breach. A number of examples illustrate this attitude (see
for example the ECJ decisions in Case 77/69 Commission v
Belgium [1970] ECR 237, para 15, and several judgments
of February 2, 1982 in Commission v Belgium; also Jan
Wouters, “National Constitutions and the European
Union”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Volume 27,
2000 – I , pp 56 and 57, notes 127 and 128). A Member
State cannot rely upon provisions of its constitution for the
purpose of justifying a failure to comply with obligations
and time-limits resulting from Directives (ECJ Case
100/77 Commission v Italy [1978] ECR 887, para 21, and
Lenaerts/van Nuffel Constitutional Law of the European Union,
pp 574 -75, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999).
According to the opinion of de Zwaan, Article 10 EC
encompasses an obligation of a general and broad, but not
very precise, character. Thus although its merits and
importance have been increasing over the years, also in the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the significance of
Article 10 EC in the context of the present discussion is to
be seen as the reflection of a general attitude to be
expected from an average and loyal Member State rather
than serving as a basis to impose specific and concrete
conduct on the state concerned. It may be considered as a
source of inspiration for the national judiciary, nothing less
but also nothing more. In our opinion, it may be also
considered as a source of inspiration for the national
governments to take measures to adapt its national
constitution in order to avoid a ratification crisis.
From all the above-mentioned considerations, it is
suggested that the following two legal and political
solutions would resolve the constitutional problems in the
Irish case.
In the first place, in our opinion Article 10 EC and
Article 11(2) EU may be also considered as a source of
inspiration for the Irish Government to “take all
appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of
the Community... “ To improve the support of the Irish
people for its government policies and stimulate greater
participation of the Irish people at these referenda it is
necessary to raise awareness of the advantages of European
integration. In this situation a more successful and
government-friendly outcome of referenda may be
expected.
In the second place, Article 10 EC (...”They shall abstain
from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment
of the objectives of this Treaty”) may inspire the Irish
Government to propose to its electorate an amendment of
its constitution for example by proposing for some cases a
replacement in the constitution of referenda by a
Parliamentary procedure if this would improve the EU
decision-making procedure and the attainment of the
objectives of the Treaty, especially for complicated treaties.
As such Treaty texts are not easily understood by ordinary
Irish people, it seems better to submit these texts to
Members of Parliament who may consult their legal staff. 35
Amicus Curiae Issue 75 Autumn 2008
36
Amicus Curiae Issue 75 Autumn 2008
The text of the Treaty on European Union of 1991 was
already very complicated, and the text of the Treaty on
European Union after the Amsterdam amendment is still
more inaccessible and difficult to consult because of the
insertion of many new Articles, Protocols and Declarations
and the renumbering of the Consolidated Treaty text.
These issues are discussed in Improving the Quality of
Legislation in Europe, TMC Asser Instituut, Report of the
Conference, pp XXXV and XXXVI, Editors Alfred E
Kellermann et al, Kluwer Law International, The Hague,
1998.
The text of the Treaty of Lisbon is even more
inaccessible, complicated and difficult to understand (see
Lisbon Treaty Summaries, Europa Institute of Leiden
University, March 19, 2008 and “The Treaty of Lisbon,
process, architecture and substance”, Paul Craig, European
Law Review 2008, 33(2), pp 137 – 66). It was therefore to
be expected that the ordinary people of Ireland might say
“no” in a referendum on a text which they did not
understand, except perhaps if they were experts in
European law! Moreover they have not sufficiently been
aware of all the advantages of EU Membership for Ireland.
Lastly, reference should be made to the excellent
suggestions made by Bruno de Witte on the legal scenarios
for dealing with a ratification crisis in The EU Constitution:
the Best Way Forward?, Edited by Deirdre Curtin, Alfred
E Kellermann and Steven Blockmans, TMC Asser Press,
2005.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, I refer to the following legal scenarios and
options which are possible in theory, but their scenarios
need to be developed:
1. Partial entry into force and the creation of an
“enhanced union”.
2. Informal application of the Treaty, without basing it on
the formal authority that would have resulted from the
entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The closer cooperation mechanism which exists since
the Treaty of Amsterdam but has remained unused,
could operate in order to allow “willing and able”
Member States to pursue deeper integration.
4. The renegotiation scenario, which I would not support
since it is in my opinion not a realistic option. The
Lisbon Treaty is already a political balance between
conflicting interests. If you start cherry-picking you
open a Pandora’s box, and it will be a never-ending
process.
5. Ireland could follow the example of Denmark, where
voters initially rejected the Maastricht Treaty that paved
the way for the European monetary union, only to vote
yes after four opt-outs were guaranteed. The right way
forward is to find specific national solutions that are
acceptable for Ireland and the Irish people.
I believe that the last option is in the short run the best way
forward.
Alfred E Kellermann
Team Leader, EU Cards project “Strengthening the Ministry of European
Integration in Albania,” Tirana Senior Legal and Policy Advisor TMC
Asser Institute, The Hague.
POSTSCRIPTUM
The Financial Times carried a report on June 16 that Ireland will be offered additional guarantees of its sovereignty –
possibly in areas such as taxation, military policy and family law – under an emergency plan to save the Lisbon Treaty. An
unnamed senior EU official is reported as saying that the solution would involve an offer of “explanatory protocols” stating
explicitly that Lisbon does not affect Ireland’s power to set its own tax rates, maintain its traditional neutrality and control
abortion policy. EU leaders are discussing the issue, and if Brian Cowen, the Irish prime minister, supports the idea of
additional protocols for Ireland, it may be possible for a detailed proposal to be presented at a subsequent EU summit in
October.
It remains to be seen whether the Irish Government, having accepted the proposed protocols, would hold a second
referendum. The Financial Times report quotes Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s prime minister and the EU’s longest-
serving national leader, who feels that if Ireland found it impossible to ratify Lisbon, some countries should go ahead with
deeper political and economic integration using clauses in the Nice Treaty.
